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Design Bearings 
Margaret Macintyre Latta 
The use of the term “design” is prevalent in education talk (e.g., see the theme is-
sue of Educational Researcher, vol. 32, no. 1 [2003]). Some of this talk tends to 
cast design as representations manifested through applied method as ways to 
solve and address educational practices and issues (e.g., Constantine & Lock-
wood, 1999; Dick & Carey, 1990; Edelson, 2002; Kelly & Lesh, 2000). Within this 
focus on representation an impulse for generality and commensurability seems 
to dictate; either the data must be seen to correspond to some external reality, or 
the subjects must agree (e.g., Brown, 1992; Brown & Campione, 1996; Cobb, 
Confrey, diSessa, Lehrer, & Schauble, 2003; Collins, 1992; Hoadley, 2002). De-
sign can become an act that reifies and totalizes what is present, and the future, 
that which is absent, different, possible, and yet-to-be-achieved, disappears. Such 
disregard for the future concerns me and tells me the role of design in education 
is neglecting its artistic roots and traditions, potentially undermining the 
strengths that design offers education. Certainly, arts-based educational re-
searchers (e.g., Barone, 1995, 2001a, 2001b; Barone & Eisner, 1997; Eisner, 1991, 
1997, 1999) have fore-grounded these strengths, valuing the creation of an alter-
native reality, seeing ambiguity as productive, utilizing expressive, contextual-
ized, and vernacular language, suggesting and promoting empathy and insights 
moving “toward uncovering obscured questions” (Barone, 2001a, p. 25). But, 
such thinking seems to be absent from much of the body of work recently co-
opting the term design and in my opinion risks losing sight of the integral nature 
of design vital within the act of designing. Specifically, the loss of temporality 
and interplay through reliance on concepts brought to bear, rather than bearings 
found within the act of designing, will be examined. To do so, I draw primarily 
on the thinking of Dewey (1934, 1938) and Bakhtin (1990, 1993) as both ground 
their thinking in the actuality of the creating act. The Aristotelian notion of repe-
tition as permeating the act of designing, evoking an exploratory, restless move-
ment, is taken up as a means to see and experience the strengths of designing. 
Repetition is not simply a methodological, theoretical, or philosophical notion, 
but a moral one. I suggest that the act of designing demands what Caputo (1987) 
calls an “ethics of dissemination.” The act of designing entails a moral obligation 
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to the future of our work, to generativity, to the possibility that what is “wholly 
other” (Caputo, 2000) might remain so, and resist being calcified into a repre-
sentative design.  
The Act of Designing 
The act of designing assumes that one must enter as a designer into such acts. 
Attending to the act of designing within the act of designing and not the design 
itself, becomes the focus. Contrarily, design can be taken up as a representative 
form, assuming functionary, imposed roles. The danger of calcifying design 
arises. Rather, the artistic roots and traditions of design take up design as a proc-
ess emerging out of the act. Design is always being yielded. It is the capacity to 
see this yielding movement that is the strength of design and is underestimated. 
Returning to the etymological origin of design from the Latin designare meaning 
to mark out, I search for the bearings upon which yielding design depends, the 
conditions of designing grounded in the designer’s capacity to concomitantly see 
and act within the adapting, building, creating process of designing. It is this 
search for bearings that I desire to gain greater access into, in order to recognize, 
foster, and nurture the terms of design in others.  
I turn to Bakhtin’s (1990, 1993) early aesthetic essays and Dewey’s (1934, 
1938) later works to pursue the conditions of design. Though each writes from 
their own perspective and context, both Bakhtin and Dewey ground thinking in 
the creating process itself. Bearings/lived terms emerge for me from each thinker 
that cultivates “the thinking in situations” (Albers, 1969, p. 35) which enables 
seeing. In this way, both Bakhtin and Dewey help me to insist that design must 
be understood in terms of human action. Thus, the act of designing is taken up 
throughout the paper as the act of knowing; the designing process of under-
standing in relation to action itself. Bakhtin and Dewey provide a language that 
articulates the terms of design and allows me to envision these terms within my 
educational practices. Indeed, this is Dewey’s (1904) claim, that this movement 
must be known before it can be directed (p. 21).  
Searching with Bakhtin 
Bakhtin (1993) emphasizes the uniqueness and singularity of creating for each 
person. From within the act or deed, participatory thinking orients individuals. 
This focus on the act as it is happening makes it necessary to see the act not as a 
given contemplated at a distance, but to see from within, a taking into account of 
the givenness, moment by moment. “And all these moments, which make up the 
event in its totality, are present to him (sic) as something given and as something 
to be achieved conjointly” (p. 30). The simultaneous awareness of both some-
thing given and something yet-to-be-achieved is crucial to the intent of Bak-
htin’s attempt to describe the world in which the act/actor becomes aware of it-
self/him/herself; a catching of self in the act. He is clear that it is not aimed at 
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describing the world produced by that act. It is through Bakhtin’s thinking that I 
realize that the concrete is not simply a step toward something else, but rather, 
concomitantly a knowing of the present and how to meaningfully proceed. He 
grounds the creating act in the unique human being, located spatially and tem-
porally in the phenomenology of self/other relations. Bakhtin portrays such en-
tering into self/other relations as occurring through events to be lived out, en-
acted, or achieved:  
In which the moments of what-is-given, and what-is-to-be-achieved, of 
what is and what ought to be, of being and value, are inseparable. All 
these abstract categories are here constituent moments of a certain liv-
ing, concrete, and palpable (intuitable) once-occurrent whole—an 
event. (p. 32) 
Thus the creator finds him/herself in a space between what-is-given and what-is-
to-be-achieved. Bakhtin (1990) further describes such a space as the problem of 
content, material, and form; content being what work is about, material being the 
concrete and abstract matter out of which work is constructed, and form being 
the relationships in work between self, content, and materials (pp. 257–325). 
But, the problem of content, material, and form does not require a problem 
solver so much as the capacity Bakhtin (1993) terms aesthetic seeing. Aesthetic 
seeing is characterized as a releasing or opening of one self to the present; an 
immersion in immediacy. It offers accounts of experienced space, time, body, 
and human relations as they are lived. There is an ebb and flow; a rhythmic qual-
ity to time that is not determined by external timetables. It requires listening, re-
sponding, and openness in what is heard and what is said. Such engagement 
thrives on unforeseen possibilities. Such a space places self clearly in the midst, as 
catalyst and sounding board. Bakhtin (1993) explains: “What constitutes this cen-
ter is the human being: everything in this world acquires significance, meaning, 
and value only in correlation with man (sic)—as that which is human” (p. 61). In 
other words, the act of creating is oriented through actual experiencing, demand-
ing interconnections between self and other. Bakhtin (1993) further clarifies: 
Content, after all, does not fall into my head like a meteor from another 
world, continuing to exist there as a self-enclosed and impervious frag-
ment, as something that is not woven into the unitary fabric of my emo-
tional-volitional, my living and effective, thinking-experiencing, in the 
capacity of an essential moment in that thinking-experiencing. (p. 33) 
Content comes to be understood within the act of participation in events them-
selves, thus characterized as unique, lived, embodied, and contextual, wholly  
dependent on self-involvement. Aesthetic seeing searches for the potential in 
materials to provide direction, both shaping and limiting inquiry. The connec-
tions fostered are a catalyst to insights, giving the inquiry meaning and life. Thus, 
Bakhtin (1990) describes form and material as: “The form of content, but a form 
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which is realized in the material—is attached to the material, as it were” (p. 303). 
So, form is understood as the expression of activity. And, form very much in-
cludes “its creator within itself” (pp. 315–316). Bakhtin’s description of the in-
ternally active human being as creator entering form through seeing, hearing, 
evaluating, connecting, and selecting—takes life. “Form ceases to be outside us 
as perceived and cognitively ordered material; it becomes an expression of a 
value-related activity that penetrates content and transforms it” (p. 305). Thus, 
the process is inseparable from the product. Bakhtin (1993) claims this requires 
participants: “Know how not to detach their performed act from its product, 
but, rather how to relate both of them to the unity and unique context of life and 
seek to determine them in that context as an indivisible unity” (p. 19). 
Bakhtin (1990) suggests a language that expresses the flux, the movement 
necessary to grapple in-between self, content, material, and form, fusing process 
and product into an interdependent, ongoing unity. Within this indivisible unity 
Bakhtin introduces the language of answerability, outsideness, and unfinalizability 
for describing involvement in the creating act. He portrays answerability arising 
out of a fundamental reciprocity between self and content, continually relating 
to personal understandings and values. Bakhtin explains how this is not derived 
from a mechanical relationship of parts to whole. “The parts of such a whole are 
contiguous and touch each other, but in themselves they remain alien to each 
other” (p. 1). Rather, answerability is dependent on personal involvement. Such 
involvement necessitates taking “an axiological stand in every moment of one’s 
life or to position oneself with respect to values” (pp. 87–88). Bakhtin further 
explains that he sees this living and moving “not in a vacuum, but in an intense 
axiological atmosphere of responsible, answerable, indetermination” (p. 275). 
Bakhtin’s claim is that answerability is not a given, but rather, is seen as a task 
to engage in and with, through participation in the creating process. An emo-
tional commitment and involvement expressing what is particular and irre-
placeable in each situated individual comes forth. Through participation indi-
viduals question. By deliberating and doing they become answerers; response 
entails responsibility. The subject matter starts to matter to individuals and 
one’s distinctiveness from others can become a catalyst to enlarged understand-
ings and diverse thinking. Bakhtin (1986) explains how outsideness makes this 
possible. Outsideness speaks to his interpretation of the self as a fully embodied 
self, a self that is constituted interdependently with the other. Outsideness is ex-
perienced through an interdependence realized at boundaries where understand-
ings come up against or meet another. Each needs the other. A self-consciousness 
takes hold that is not ground in a solitary consciousness, but rather a developing 
greater consciousness of other, others, and in turn, self. Thus, neither self nor 
other are bound entities; they intermingle in a body-world relationship yielding 
an outsideness, belonging as much to the other as self. These new meanings are 
tentative, representing moments of clarity but also blurred with unfinished or 
incomplete thoughts. Participants make judgments derived largely on what sur-
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faces during process. This is the nature of Bakhtin’s (1990) notion of unfinaliza-
bilty (pp. 121–132). The interaction of self and other is ongoing and ultimately 
unfinalizable. There is openness to unasked for and unpredictable learnings. 
Change and transformation are always possible. 
Searching with Dewey 
The primacy of interaction portrayed by Bakhtin (1993) is integral to Dewey’s 
(1934, 1938) central philosophical notion of experience. Dewey also finds that the 
creative act offers a language and a way of seeing that addresses the experience 
from within experience. Dewey (1934) speaks of art as a creative act offering: 
“Living and concrete proof that man (sic) is capable of restoring consciously and 
thus on the place of meaning, the union of sense, need, impulse, and action 
characteristic of the live creature” (p. 25). Thus, art exemplifies a living experi-
ence, a consummation of a movement where a “conclusion is no separate and 
independent thing” (p. 38). There is a wholeness that must not be simplified. 
The wholeness is derived from Dewey’s emphasis on an organic sense of experi-
ence inherent in the constitution of what it means to be human-embodied 
within each of us. Experience is the life that comprises the organic whole—the 
human being. There is a vital connection within experience to the past, present, 
and future. Dewey (1938) portrays people living both in (interaction) and 
through an environment (continuity) (p. 24). “Different situations succeed one 
another, but because of the principle of continuity something is carried over 
from the earlier to the later one” (p. 44). The conceptions of situation and inter-
action are inseparable. “An experience is always what it is because of a transac-
tion taking place between an individual and what, at the time, constitutes his 
(sic) environment” (p. 41). The two principles of continuity and interaction in-
tercept and unite (p. 42). Dewey (1934) emphasizes that experience comes to be 
“what it is because of the entire pattern to which it contributes and which it is 
absorbed” (p. 295). Thus experience involves participants actively structuring 
what is encountered through active undergoing with an open, vulnerable, recep-
tive attitude and doing typified as responding, organizing, and discerning. Dewey 
(1934) explains that the interplay between undergoing and doing is always evolv-
ing with beginnings and endings occurring throughout, thus: “An experience has 
pattern and structure, because it is not just doing and undergoing in alteration, 
but consists of them in relationship” (p. 295). Such interplay seems very similar 
to the relationship Bakhtin conveys living in-between content, material, and 
form; a relationship that both Dewey and Bakhtin identify as requiring seeing. 
Bakhtin’s notion of aesthetic seeing parallels Dewey’s distinction between recog-
nition and seeing. Recognition is about labeling and categorizing, but seeing en-
tails receptivity, assuming a commitment to finding out about the ensuing inter-
actions. Dewey’s talk of purpose characterized as an attitude rather than a specific 
goal or aim clarifies the intents of this distinction: “The essential point is that the 
purpose grow and take shape through the process of social intelligence” (p. 83). 
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Connectedness is discussed as the organizational thread thus Dewey claims: “We 
have no choice but to operate in accord with the pattern it (experience) provides 
or else to neglect the place of intelligence in the development and control of a 
living and moving experience” (p. 88). Dewey assumes an active participant 
adapting, building, and changing meaning in an ongoing conversation between 
self and other very much embracing Bakhtin’s notions of answerability, outside-
ness, and unfinalizability. The implied unity and movement are critical to under-
standing Dewey’s (1938) notion of experience as a moving force. He clarifies: 
In such experiences, every successive part flows freely, without seam and 
without unfilled blanks, into what ensues. At the same time there is not 
sacrifice of the self-identity of the parts . . . In an experience, flow is from 
something to something. As one part leads into another and as one part 
carries on what went before, each gains distinctiveness in itself. The en-
during whole is diversified by successive phases that are emphases of its 
varied colors. (p. 45) 
Inherent Conditions and Consequences of Design 
Bakhtin (1993) and Dewey (1934, 1938) convey like conditions found within the 
actuality of the creating act that are worth paying closer attention to regarding 
the nature of design. Both Bakhtin and Dewey argue that it is impossible to sepa-
rate parts away from the entirety of the act of creating meaning. It is experienced 
as connected, all parts linked in relation to the vital movement of the whole, be-
longing to the self and situation concerned in this movement. In this way both 
portray the act of creating meaning positioning participators to be wholly in-
volved. Bakhtin conveys a space created that positions participants in-between 
content, material, and form pervaded by his (1990) notions of answerability, 
outsideness, and unfinalizability. And as Dewey conveys, momentary semblances 
of meaning come to be. But such semblances are dynamic; parts are always 
evolving and unfolding into further semblances of meaning. Meaning is some-
thing always to be achieved, striving for unrealized potential. And, it is a learning 
space only for “those who wish and know how to think participatively” (Bakhtin, 
1993, p. 19) experienced as a “kind of mental activity which characterizes mental 
growth and, hence, the educative process” (Dewey, 1904, p. 22). 
Finding accordance with the vital movement of the whole entails finding 
direction within the movement, a knowing in action intimately and necessarily 
related within the movement itself (Dewey, 1938, p. 20). Failure to take the mov-
ing force of experience into account betrays experience. Such betrayals manifest 
themselves through focusing on ends, ignoring the elements of knowing within 
experience. Dewey (1938) met this betrayal of experience in the misinterpreta-
tions of his thinking often stripping experience of its dynamic unfolding and un-
dergoing character. Thus, he wrote of the need of a theory of experience (p. 25). 
Bakhtin sought such a theory too, keenly aware that the rational and sensuous 
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aspects of our being are in a constant state of reciprocity. It seems both Bakhtin 
and Dewey value temporality and interplay as givens to be worked with and si-
multaneously working as dynamic practices, permeating the act of creating 
meaning. Synthesizing my searches with Bakhtin and Dewey, I find temporality 
and interplay to hold the following interdependent consequences for the nature 
of design, its organization, form and ensuing relationships, giving expression to 
the bearings/lived terms of designing: 
Design—a discourse by nature  
Embodying the very unique, personal, humanness of meaning making, knowl-
edge resides in self-experience. The act of knowing entails a “reorganizing or re-
construction of experience” (Dewey, 1934, p. 76), past informing present, with 
implications for the future. This temporal reorganizing/reconstructing process is 
likened to a dialogue between self and other. The discourse entered into becomes 
the design. The Latin root of discourse is discursus, a running about. The implied 
sense of movement and the unique experience of this running are integral con-
siderations. Thus, a pattern of thought acknowledging the interplay of context, 
time, and personal experience grows, becoming the necessary link to sense mak-
ing, suggesting a design organization and form. 
Organization—inquiry guided  
The temporal discourse Bakhtin (1993) and Dewey (1934, 1938) give expression 
to is not simply interactive, it entails dwelling within context. The relational in-
terplay must be attended to from within the search for meaning. I am reminded 
of Maxine Greene’s (1988) “dialectic of freedom,” in which “one’s reality rather 
than being fixed and predefined is a perpetual emergent, becoming increasingly 
multiplex, as more perspectives are taken, more texts are opened, more friend-
ships are made” (p. 23). This emergent nature characterizes the organization in 
the making, derived from the inquiry itself. Most importantly, transformation 
occurs with all changing in the process. This is Gadamer’s (1992) understanding 
of play as distinct from self and other. Play is its own experience, reuniting 
means and ends, reliant on the performance (p. 134). It is the performance, the 
Bakhtinian act and the Deweyan experience that has a spirit of its own which par-
ticipants must attend to and take up. The reciprocal interaction and modifica-
tion entailed, transforms meanings in the making.  
Form—a narrative way of knowing 
The act of creating meaning is socially motivated, socially embedded, and de-
rived from the personal narratives of experience. Narrative is a form where the 
interplay of time, place, experience, and personal knowledge can be represented 
fully. The relations, connections, and interactions are parts of the whole. Unity is 
something both Bakhtin (1993) and Dewey (1934, 1938) see revealed in the form 
of the action as a whole. Narrative demands such a search for unity, evolving and 
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reforming as knowledge is constructed and generated. Therefore, to talk of the 
act/experience of creating meaning takes a narrative form, acknowledging the 
multiplicity of knowing and the dialectical relationships involved.  
Inherently and necessarily relational 
Implicit within design, and its organization, and form are multiple intersecting 
relations holding the potential to generate the ongoing designing movement of 
thought. Bakhtin (1993) and Dewey (1934, 1938) do not characterize this move-
ment in any way as arbitrary, and yet uncertainty is integral to the process. The 
differences between arbitrariness and embracing uncertainties are important and 
need to be examined more fully. Neither Bakhtin nor Dewey suggests a pre-
determined plan. Arbitrariness denies the existence of relationships with no ac-
knowledgement of what particularities bring to situations. It is aimless, at the 
mercy of fortuitous events. It does not look back or ahead, with no end in sight. 
Thus it assumes a carefree, careless abandonment to the moment. Arbitrariness 
is characterized as thoughtless and reckless. Embracing uncertainties is distin-
guished from arbitrariness through its deliberate nature. This deliberate nature 
does not entail a predetermined and fixed purpose, though. Rather, decisions are 
derived from within situations demanding receptivity to sensory qualities and re-
lations between self and other on an ongoing basis. In other words, the invention 
and creation of meaning is sought. A spirit of inquiry emerges of its own voli-
tion. This centers on discovery, with this neither being an object or a concept, 
but a deliberate, ongoing search concomitantly seeking and giving self to the crea-
tion. Such seeking and giving of self embraces means and ends. Dewey (1934) 
talks of the artist assuming the attitude of the perceiver while involved in the 
making process. Only as ends and means are taken together, made part of one’s 
response, can this form a continuum. Embracing uncertainties is necessarily pre-
sent acting as a catalyst. Space for speculation, projection, the unanticipated, 
guides and provides direction. Embracing uncertainties as strength is the catalyst 
sustaining the movement integral to both Dewey’s and Bakhtin’s thinking. And 
as Dewey (1916) claims, “This is a doctrine of humility; but it is also a doctrine 
of direction. For it tells us to open the eyes and ears of the mind, to be sensitive 
to all the varied phases of life and history” (pp. 11–12). So, arbitrariness is not 
present. Embracing uncertainties through discernment is a better fit as both 
Dewey and Bakhtin convey a relational designing movement as a discourse by 
nature. The designing movement is inquiry guided, narrative in form, and inher-
ently relational, concomitantly seeing, thinking, doing, and acting responsibly.  
Dynamics of Design: Seeing and Repetition 
Designing through discernment requires sensitivity to a medium as a medium 
(Dewey, 1934, p. 199). It asks us to attend to “that which appears qualitatively 
and focally at a particular moment” (Dewey, 1926, p. 7), taking an interest in 
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that which appears. Interestedness is about being in the middle of things—the 
space found between self and other derived from within the act of participation. 
And, such participation is always extending and enlarging derived from the bear-
ings disclosed within the movement. Bakhtin (1990) characterizes such partici-
pation through his interrelated notions of answerability, outsideness and unfi-
nalizability. Dewey (1934) characterizes such participation through his 
interrelated notions of doing and undergoing. Undergirding both characteriza-
tions is the notion of repetition. Repetition is a notion that Risser (1997, p. 34) 
traces back to Aristotle (1925). Repetition is discussed as a turn and re-turn to 
self understanding, acting on possibilities. Acknowledging and working with 
temporality and interplay demands repetition. Risser explains that in “this tem-
poral movement of the self toward its future possibilities, one recommits oneself 
to the possibilities that are recognized as one’s own” where “past possibilities of 
action become future possibilities and are repeated in the moment of decision” 
(p. 38). Thus, Risser concludes that repetition is “fundamentally dynamic” (p. 
39). In so doing, he clearly distinguishes dynamic repetition (creative and life 
giving) from static repetition (repeating the same). It is dynamic repetition that I 
see as the central task of designing. Creating meaning entails coming to under-
stand differently, and thus concomitantly, creating and re-creating self. This re-
petitive movement is a continuous process of coming to see; a backward move-
ment that recovers and re-presents alongside a forward movement that generates 
and evokes. Perhaps, the role and place of repetitive seeing as the source of the 
movement is what has been repeatedly misinterpreted and misunderstood, be-
traying design as a moving force. Carr (2000) alludes to this identifying techni-
cist and non-technicist seeing as the crux of “much confusion in educational de-
bate” (p. 76). Seeing taken up in a technicist manner ignores the particularities 
of context and follows procedures to a pre-given end. Thus, technicist seeing re-
duces action to predefined behavior, substituting finite goals for transforma-
tional thinking, and replacing judgment with predetermined rules and skills. 
Rather, non-technicist seeing considers what is at stake in a situation. This is not 
a generalizable imposed wisdom but rather specific to a moment, unanticipated. 
And, most importantly, furthers the movement of thought in self and others. 
But, the repetitive seeing entailed in entering as a creator into designing most 
importantly positions the creator to see with potential involving a curious inter-
play between self and other, between creating and being created. Potential refers 
to Gadamer’s (1992) insistence that  
Although it is necessary to see what a situation is asking of us, this seeing 
does not mean that we perceive in the situation what is visible as such, 
but that we learn to see it as the situation of action and hence in the light 
of what is right. (p. 322) 
I use “curious” to acknowledge the embodied particularities of such exchanges  
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that cannot reoccur. The interplay discloses ways of seeing living within the 
movement. It is the dynamic and transformational understanding of repetitive 
seeing that is missing, more apt to be undermined, the movement is thwarted. 
This is why Dewey (1938) adamantly distinguishes between educative and mis-
educative experience (p. 75). And, Bakhtin (1993) cannot imagine living in a 
world where content is imposed: “In that world I am unnecessary, I am essen-
tially and fundamentally non-existent in it” (p. 9).  
The link between repetitive seeing and its potential for the future is the 
moral grounding that takes repetition beyond simply a methodological, theoreti-
cal, or philosophical consideration. What gets produced is other; beyond what 
might be given, or specified in advance by theory, or guaranteed by method. It 
assumes a concern with what it is that ought to be done; a mode or way of being 
in the world entailing pursuit of the good. And, such a search for the good is al-
ways in immediate relationship to the whole arising from the particulars of situa-
tion and returning to situation. It is not about gazing out upon an external world 
applying meaning but rather meaning in the making deemed fitting to situations 
on an on going basis. Caputo (1987) is helpful here arguing that the story of 
much methodology, theory, and philosophy has been to “still the flux, to contain 
its course, to arrest its play” (p. 257). Instead he proposes an “ethics of dissemi-
nation” awakening us to the play, fostering a “fresh cut into the complexity of 
the situations we face” (p. 261). Caputo explains that an ethics of dissemination 
“requires the hardiness of repetition” . . . to instill motion that is “flexible, in 
flux, reformable, responding forward” (p. 263). There is both a vigilant suspicion 
and a concern for attending to the play itself that can be operationalized only 
through a community engaged in an ongoing discourse. Openness to possibility 
is key. There is a moral obligation to the future, to generativity, to the possible 
that what is “wholly other” (Caputo, 2000) might remain so.  
Conclusion 
Discovery and invention yield design, bringing forth a tangible form. There is lit-
tle room for exploring designing as being-in-the-world where rigid rules dictate 
the way in which design should be represented. Limitations unduly impinge 
upon or restrict the possibilities for designing. Design as being-in-the-world 
comes from playing with possibilities, searching for relationships. The develop-
ment of such thinking in situation allows for the discovery of potential. It per-
mits possibilities to be included as the search evolves. Without a playful spirit it 
would seem that imaginative thought, requiring speculation and conjecturing 
about possibilities, might not be possible. So as educators find themselves caught 
up in the immediacy of given situations, they are confronted with either contriv-
ing encounters to fit a fixed idea or acting on a openness to new ideas and an ac-
ceptance of alternatives through listening and responding to the particularities of 
contexts. Belief in the worthiness of the latter approach to design translates into 
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greater commitment to search for these considerations in their designing prac-
tices. The act of creating meaning makes visible the bearings of its own visibility. 
The bearings lie in constantly questioning what we see and think about the world 
as it opens up.  
The process becomes a search for intentionality that articulates a different 
mode of design rooted within its artistic traditions; one that is reflexive, an inter-
change of interpretations asking all involved to continually revise and enlarge 
understandings. This manifesting character assumes a mode of design under-
stood as coming into being, reliant on the relational complexities coming to-
gether in particular teaching/learning situations and the ongoing contemplation 
of these relations. It restores the participatory, active nature to design taking life 
as a movement of thought. Bakhtin (1990, 1993) and Dewey (1934, 1938) denote 
design bearings that must be heeded, providing images and vocabulary to see 
anew. The act of designing shapes and guides from within meaning making, tak-
ing its bearings from the particularities coming together, concomitantly aware of 
circumstances and the potential of those circumstances. Such a repetitive move-
ment seeks out and seizes back possibilities in life. Designing accordingly entails 
seeing the concrete situation as it is, and as it might be.  
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